The most important positive achievement of the Stockholm Agreement was the Hodeida Front. Fighting in Hodeidah has been suspended for nearly a year and the ceasefire has lasted for about 13 months. This is thanks to the field presence of the United Nations Mission in Support of the Hodeida Agreement [UNMHA], established in January 2019, whose mandate was extended for six months on 13 January 2020. Although it has faced considerable difficulties and belongs to its third leader, it is now fully occupied and has set up 4 “observation posts” in the city of Hodeidah, which help keep the area free of fighting and facilitate the transit of goods between the port and inland roads. Less successful was the “deployment of forces”, which called for the transfer of forces from both sides and the transfer of the three ports to local security forces, agreed by both sides and approved by the United Nations. This formulation, of course, allowed each party to interpret the situation as it wished, which was exactly what it was doing. Thanks to the presence of UN Secretary-General António Guterres at the closing ceremony, the Stockholm Agreement was announced with great fanfare as a major step towards ending the war. The agreement has three parts: the first concerns the exchange of up to 16,000 prisoners between the two parties; the second, a ceasefire and demilitarization of the city and port of Hodeidah and the two ports of Salif and Ras Issa; and the third is the formation of a committee to work on a de-escalation of the fighting in Taiz. The whole document is only 3 pages long, and it would be very difficult to produce something more vague. The lack of detail and precision reflects the reluctance of both sides to compromise or seek a solution in the interests of the Yemeni people. The commitments set out in the Stockholm Agreement included three parts: the Hodeidah Agreement, the Taiz Agreement and a Prisoner Exchange Agreement.
Taken together, these commitments committed to (1) a ceasefire in the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa, and the deployment of forces on both sides; [14] (2) the opening of humanitarian corridors for the transport of relief supplies through these ports; [15] and (3) a prisoner exchange with the aim of freeing more than 15,000 prisoners and detainees. [16] The parties also agreed on discussions on the creation of a humanitarian corridor that would allow humanitarian aid to reach Taiz governorate. [17] Prior to the Stockholm Agreement, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) warned that the destruction of the port would have represented a “turning point” beyond which it would have been impossible to avoid massive loss of life due to famine. UNICEF estimated that 300,000 children would starve to death if the port was closed. Blame the parties to the conflict for facilitating unhindered humanitarian access to areas where control has recently changed. Comprehensive facilitation includes compliance with previously signed sub-agreements with other authority structures and ensuring that all essential life-saving measures, including protection and demining programmes, can continue without interruption. The intention of the parties to take human rights considerations into account when agreeing on the Stockholm Agreement is crucial. In view of the serious and widespread international crimes and human rights violations claimed by all parties, it is important that the parties, in supporting the Stockholm Agreement, “explicitly recognize the importance of urgent treatment” of the “humanitarian situation” with regard to prisoners in Yemen and the basis for their agreement on “legal procedures and provisions, in particular the conventions, principles and norms of international humanitarian law [and] of human rights”. [30] The parties went so far as to involve the International Committee of the Red Cross to “ensure respect for basic humanitarian principles and procedures”[31] and to acknowledge that humanitarian considerations motivated the ceasefire and the deployment of troops in Hodeidah.
The Hodeidah agreement prevented a potentially catastrophic offensive on the city and ports. The ceasefire, which entered into force on 18 December 2018, has contributed to a safer environment for the civilian population. An estimated 150,000 people who had left the city returned after the agreement came into effect, with the ceasefire still largely in place. The Security Council approved the Stockholm Agreement in accordance with resolution 2451 (2018). The Hodeida Agreement is the main element of the Stockholm Agreement and certainly the one that has received the most attention from the United Nations Special Envoy [UNSE] and his team. Hodeidah is the main port through which staple foods arrive and reach the majority of the Yemeni population. Yemenis depend on imports for more than 90% of their wheat and 100% of other basic commodities [rice, tea, sugar, etc.], as well as most fuels. The majority of the population is under Houthi control in the northern highlands, so the importance of access via the port of Hodeidah cannot be overstated. Just over a year ago, the international community welcomed the revival of the UN-led peace process in Yemen with the conclusion of the Stockholm Agreement between the Yemeni government and the Houthi uprising (Ansar Allah), under the mediation of UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths. Although the agreement represented the first political breakthrough in the peace process since the collapse of the Geneva and Kuwait talks under Griffith`s predecessor, the resulting obstacles to implementation meant that hopes for success were short-lived. When assessing progress on the three key elements of the agreement – the prisoner exchanges, Hodeidah and Taiz – it quickly becomes clear that the truism that the implementation of the peace agreements is much more important and difficult than their conclusion still seems true.
While Yemen remains the world`s worst humanitarian crisis, the Stockholm Agreement has managed to avert further deterioration that would have endangered hundreds of thousands of Yemeni lives. Subsequently, the second legislature of the agreement, as set out in both the Hodeidah Agreement and the Taiz Agreement, aimed at “the opening of humanitarian corridors”[23] in order to “facilitate the free movement of civilians and goods … and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.” [24] This is where the Stockholm Agreement helps with regard to the government of Yemen and the Houthi fighters who have agreed to the terms. Evidence that the Parties to the Agreement were motivated and influenced by human rights considerations, combined with the explicit recognition that the provisions of the Agreement are humanitarian in nature and in conformity with international human rights law, indicates the recognition of human rights and humanitarian responsibility with respect to indiscriminate attacks against civilians, access to humanitarian assistance; and abuse and torture during arbitrary and unlawful detention. More importantly, it also creates a basis for victims to hold these parties accountable for the breach of these obligations. Thus, what has been agreed in Sweden does not represent a major political breakthrough, but rather increased international pressure, which is by no means guaranteed in the future, and a degree of pragmatism on the part of Yemeni parties and their international supporters that may not last. Even then, the Houthis and the government were keen to stress that the prisoner exchange and the Hodeidah agreement were not political agreements and should not be seen as paving the way for a broader peace agreement. The first term was an “agreement on the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa”[18], which mainly accepted an “immediate ceasefire” and then a “mutual transfer of forces” in these areas.
[19] What to do? The United Nations, with the support of the P5, should clarify the minimum threshold necessary for the implementation of the Hodeida Agreement in order to allow for progress towards broader peace talks. And the United States, with the support of the United Nations, should urge Saudi Arabia to hold direct talks with the Houthis on military de-escalation, especially with regard to cross-border attacks. To convince the parties, the United Nations will need strong diplomatic assistance. The P5s have shown in the past that they can cooperate effectively in Yemen; [fn] P5 ambassadors to Yemen worked together in 2011 to support UN mediation. See Rebecca Brubaker, Things Fall Apart: Holding the Centre Together During Yemen`s 2011 Popular Uprising, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, 2018. During Yemen`s transition period from 2012 to 2014, the P5 formed the core of a contact group of embassies that worked together to support the UN-led process, which was later expanded to 18 missions abroad. During a period of diplomatic tensions over Syria and other crises in 2018, senior P5 officials identified Yemen as a potential area of cooperation, and aside from a dispute between the US and the UK in December 2018 over the wording of a Security Council resolution, they have generally worked closely together on this issue. Crisis Group interviews, Western diplomats and others, December 2018-June 2019.Hide footnote More recently, they appeared to have appeared on June 10, 2019.
The Security Council issued a statement supporting Griffiths and calling for the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement and a political solution to the war. [fn]”Security Council Press Statement on Yemen,” UN website, June 10, 2019 Hide footnote These statements of international consensus should now be underpinned by concrete measures. [fn] Crisis Group Interviews, New York, May 2019.Hide footnote Specifically, the P5 could set up a contact group at ambassadorial and ministry level to work with the special envoy, in addition to them the EU and possibly Oman in supporting roles, as well as other states acceptable to both. . . .